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3 M J L 
"THE LAV/ AND EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF CITIZENS" 
By 
HON. DON DUNSTAN. Q.C.. M.P. 
The idea that every citizen having to live subject to 
the law should have an equal and effective voice with every other 
citizen in what that lav; should "be is not new to English polity. 
The ideas were first, I think, effectively expressed "by the 
levellers during the Putney Aray debates in the English Civil War 
and resulted finally in the "brutal suppression "by Cromwell of 
those who contended for the rights of citizens on the mere "basis 
of citizenship rather than wealth, property or interest. But 
the plea of Colonel Rainborough of that time has ever since 
inspired men who were concerned to give some meaning to the word 
"democracy"to fight for effective representation of all citizens 
and he said: "The poorest he that is in England hath a right to 
live as the greatest he J' The ideas of the levellers had, 
possibly through the influence of Tom Paine as much as anyone else; 
a great effect upon American citizens at the time of the drawing 
up of the Federal Constitution in the United States and there was 
a clash between those who wanted representation of interests and 
areas on the one hand and those who wanted the representation of 
citizens regardless of their interests or the areas in which they 
lived on the other. The history of this conflict was clearly 
traced in the majority judgement of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of Wesberry against Sanders which is 
reported in the United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' 
edition, 376 U.S. 11, L.ed, 2d., at Page,!;8l. : 
" The question of how the legislature should 
be constituted precipitated the most bitter controversy 
of the Convention, One principle was uppermost in 
the minds of many delegates: that, no matter where he 
lived, each voter should have a voice equal to that of 
every other in electing members of Congress. In 
s u p p o r t t h i s principle, George Mason of Virginia 
"argued strongly for an election of the larger branch 
by the people. It was to be the grand depository of 
the democratic principle of the Government." 
James Madison agreed, saying "If the power 
is not immediately derived from the people, in propor-
tion to their numbers, we may make a paper confederacy, 
but that will be all." Repeatedly, delegates rose to 
make the.same point: that it would be unfair, unjust 
and contrary to common sense to give a small number of 
people as many Senators or Representatives as were 
allowed to much larger groups - in short, as James 
Wilson, of Pennsylvania put it, "equal numbers of people 
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ought to have an equal number of representatives 
. . . " and representatives "of different dis-
tricts ought clearly to hold the same proportion 
to each other, as their respective constituents 
hold to each other.," 
Some delegates opposed election "by the 
people. The sharpest objection arose out of the 
fear on the part of small States like Delaware 
that if popxilation were to.be the only basis of 
representation the populous States like Virginia 
would elect a large enough number of representa-
tives to wield overwhelming pov/er in the National 
Government,, Arguing that the Convention had no 
authority to depart from the plan of the Articles' 
of Confederation which gave each State an equal 
vote in the National Congress, William Paterson 
of New Jersey said, "If the sovereignty of the 
States is to be maintained, the Representatives 
must be drawn immediately from the States, not 
from the people; and we have no power to vary the 
idea of equal sovereignty." To this end he 
proposed a single legislative chamber in which 
each State, as in the Confederation, was to have an 
equal vote* A number of delegates supported this 
plan. 
The delegates who wanted every man's vote 
to count alike were sharp in their criticism of 
giving each State, "regardless of population, the 
same voice in the National Legislature. Madison 
entreated the Convention "to renounce a principle 
which was confessedly unjust," and Rufus King of 
Massachusetts "was prepared for every event, 
rather than sit down under a Government founded 
in a vicious principle of representation and which 
must be as shortlived as it would be unjust." 
The dispute came near ending the Convention 
without a Constitution. Both sides seemed for a 
time to be hopelessly obstinate. Some delegations 
threatened to withdraw from the Convention if they 
did not get their way. Seeing the controversy 
growing sharper and emotions rising, the wise and 
highly respected Benjamin Franklin arose and pleaded 
with the delegates on both sides to "part with some 
of their demands, in order that they may join in 
some accommodating proposition." At last those 
who supported representation of the people in both 
houses and those who supported it in neither were 
brought together, some expressing the fear that if 
they did not reconcile their differences, "some 
foreign sword will probably do the work for us." 
The deadlock was finally broken when a majority of 
the States agreed to what has been called the Great 
Compromise, based on a proposal which had been 
repeatedly advanced, by Roger Sherman and other 
delegates from Connecticut. It provided on the one 
hand that each State, including little Delaware and 
Rhode Island, was to have two Senaitors. As a 
further guarantee that these Senators would be 
considered state emissaries, they were to be elected 
by the state legislatures, Art I, § 3, and it was 
specially provided in Article V that no State should 
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over "be deprived of its equal representation in 
the Senate. The other side of the compromise 
was that, as provided in Art 1, § 2, members of 
the House of Representatives should be chosen 
"by the People of the several States", and should 
be "apportioned among the several States"... 
according to their respective Numbers." 
While those who wanted both Houses to represent 
the people had yielded on the Senate, they had 
not yielded on the House of Representatives. 
William Samuel Johnson, of Connecticut, had summed 
it up well: "In one branch the people, ought to 
be represented: in "the other, the States". 
The debates at the Convention make at least 
one fact abundantly clear: that when the delegates 
agreed that the House should represent "people" they 
intended that in allocating Congressmen the number 
assigned to each State should be determined solely 
by the number of the States inhabitants. The 
Constitution embodied Edmund Randolph's proposal 
for a periodic census to ensure "fair representation 
of the people," an idea endorsed by Mason as assuring 
that "numbers of inhabitants" should always be the 
measure of representation in the House of Represen-
tatives. The Convention also overwhelmingly agreed 
to a resolution offered by Randolph to base future 
apportionment squarely on numbers and to delete any 
reference to wealth. And the delegates defeated a 
motion made by Elbridge Gerry to limit the number of 
representatives from newer western States so that it 
would never exceed the number from the original states. 
It would defeat the principles solemnly embodied 
in the Great Compromise - equal representation in the 
House for equal numbers of people - for us to hold that 
within the States legislatures may draw the lines of 
congressional districts in such a way as to give some 
voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than 
others. The House of Representatives, the Convencion 
agreed, was to represent the people as individuals, 
and on a basis of complete equality for each voter. 
The delegates were quite aware of what Madison called 
the "vicious representation" in Great Britain whereby 
"Bot ten Boroughs" with few inhabitants were represented 
in Parliament on or almost on a par with cities of greater 
population. Wilson urged that people must be represented 
as individuals, so that America would escape the evils of 
the English system under which one man could send two 
members to Parliament to represent the Borough of Old 
Sarum while London's million people sent but four. 
The delegates referred to Rotten Borough's apportionment 
in some of the State's legislatures as the kind of 
objectionable governmental action that the Constitution 
should not tolerate in the election of congressional 
representatives. 
Madison in The Federalist described the system 
of division of States into congressional districts, 
the method which he and others assumed states probably 
would adopt: "The city of Philadelphia is supposed 
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to contain "between fifty and sixty thousand souls. 
It will therefore form nearly two districts for the 
choice of Federal Representatives." "Numbers," 
he said, not only are a suitable way to represent 
wealth but in any event "are the only proper scale 
of representation." . In the state conventions, 
speakers urging ratification of the Constitution 
emphasized the theme of equal representation in the 
House which had permeated the debates in Philadelphia. 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney told the South Carolina 
Convention, "the House of Representatives will be 
elected immediately by the people, and represent 
them and their personal rights individually . . . " 
Speakers at the ratifying conventions emphasized that 
the House of Representatives was meant to be free of 
the malapportionment then existing in some of the 
state legislatures -- such as those of Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, and South Carolina - and argued that 
the power given Congress in Art I, § k, was meant to 
be used to vindicate the people's right to equality of 
representation in the Hoib e. Congress' power, said 
John Steele at the North Carolina convention was not 
to be used to allow Congress to create rotten boroughs; 
in answer to another delegate's suggestion that 
Congress might use its power to favor people living 
near the seaooas't, Steele said that Congress would 
"most probably lay the state off into districts," and 
if it made laws "inconsistent with the Constitution, 
independent judges will not unhold them, nor will the 
people obey them,!f 
Soon after the Constitution was adopted, 
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, by then an Associate 
Justice of this Court, gave a series of lectures at 
Philadelphia in which, drawing on his experience as one 
of the most active members of the Constitutional 
Convention, he said: 
"All elections ought to be equal. 
Elections are equal, when a given number of citizens, 
in one part of the state, choose as many representa-
tives, as are chosen by the same number of citizens, 
in any 2>ther part of the state. In this manner, the 
proportion of the representatives and of the con-
stituents will remain invariably the same." 
It is in the light of such history that 
we must construe Art I, § 2, of the Constitution, which, 
carrying out the ideas of Madison and those of like 
views, provides that Representatives shall be chosen 
"by the People cf the several States" and shall be 
"apportioned among the several States . . . according 
to their respective Numbers." It is not surprising 
that our Court has held that this Article gives persons 
qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote and to 
have their votes counted. United States v. Mosley, 
238 US 383, 59 L ed 1355, 35 S Ct 30k; Ex parte 
Yarbrough 110 US 651, 28 L ed 27k, k S Ct 152. Not only 
can this right to vote not be denied outright, it cannot, 
consistently with Article I, be destroyed by alteration 
of ballots, see United States v Classic, 313 US 299, 
85 L ed 1368, 6l S Ct 1031, or diluted by stuffing of 
the ballot box, s e e United States v Saylor, 322 US 3 8 5 , 
88 L ed 13U1, 6k S Ct 1101. No right is more precious 
in a free country than that of having a voice in the 
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election of those who make the laws under which, as 
good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even 
the most "basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for 
classification of people in a way that unnecessarily 
abridges this right. In urging the people to adopt 
the Constitution, Madison said in No. 57 of The 
Federalist: 
"Who are to "be the electors of the 
Federal Representatives? Not the rich more than 
the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; 
not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more 
than the humble sons of obscure and unprop-'.tious 
fortune. The electors are to be the great body 
of the people of the United States . . . " 
Readers surely could have fairly taken 
this to mean,'"one person, one vote." Cf Gray v 
Sanders, 372 US 368, 381, 9 L ed 821, 831, 83 S Ct 
801. 
While it may not be possible to draw 
congressional districts with mathematical precision, 
that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's 
plain objective of making equal representation for 
equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the 
House of Representatives. That is the high 
standard of justice'and common sense which the 
Founders set for us. 
The United States Constitution provided in Article I 
Paragraph (2) that representatives be chosen by the people of 
the several States and, in fact, the actual quotation is "The 
House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen 
every second year by the people of the several States and the 
electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite 
for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature." 
Under the United States Constitution, the draviring of boundaries 
for congressional districts is in the hands of the State legis-
latures and it is significant that the United States Supreme Court 
has found that anything other than, in effect, substantially 
equal electoral districts in numbers of population, contravenes 
the provision of the Constitution that the Congress shall be chosen 
by the people of the several States, but the principle of equal 
electoral distributions has been extended by the majority of the 
United States Supreme Court to elections for both Hoib es of State 
legislatures in that country and this was done in the case of 
Reynolds against Sims, 377 U.S. Supreme Court, No. 3, at Page 533. 
While it is true that this was a case concerning the State of 
Alabama, and Alabama's own State Constitution included requirements 
for legislative representation based on population and for 
decennial!- reapportionment which had not taken place resulting in 
widely differing districts in population returning members to the 
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State legislature. The Court made it clear that the provisions 
of the li+th amendment of the Federal Constitution which required 
that : "Nor shall any State deny to any person within its juris-
diction, the equal protection of the laws", hind the States to 
provide equal representation - equal State legal representation -
for all citizens of all places as well as of all races, and I think 
a few extracts from this judgement will make it clear what the 
view of the United States Supreme Court is on this matter :-
In G-ray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, we held 
that the Georgia county unit system, applicable in 
statewide primary elections, was unconstitutional 
since it resulted in a dilution of the weight of 
the votes of certain Georgia voters merely because 
of where they resided. After indicating that the 
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments prohibit a State 
from overweighting or diluting votes on the basis 
of race or sex, we stated: 
"How then can one person be given 
twice or ten times the voting power of another 
person in a statewide election merely because . . . 
he lives in the smallest rural county? Once 
the geographical unit for which a representative 
is to be chosen is designated, all who participate 
in the election are to have an equal vote -
whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever 
their occupation, whatever their income, and 
wherever their home may be in that geographical 
unit. This is required by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concept 
of "We the people" under the Constitution visualizes 
no preferred class of voters but equality among those 
who meet the basic qualifications. The idea that 
every voter is equal to every other voter in his 
State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of 
several competing candidates, underlies many of our 
decisions," 
Continuing, we stated that "there is no indication in 
the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a 
permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified 
voters within the State." And, finally, we concluded: 
"The conception of political equality from the 
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg 
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth 
Amendments can mean only one thing - one person, one 
vote." 
We stated in Gray, however, that that case, 
"Unlike Baker v. Carr. . . . . does not involve a 
question of the degree to which the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
limits the authority of a State Legislature in 
designing the geographical districts from which 
representatives are chosen either for the State 
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Legislature or for the Federal House of Representatives 
. . . . Nor does it present the question, inherent 
in the "bicameral form of our Federal Government, 
whether a State may have one hoi£ e chosen without 
regard to population,," 
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. 
Legislators are elected "by voters, not farms or cities 
or economic interests. As long as ours is a represen-
tative form of government, and our legislatures are those 
instruments of government elected directly "by and 
directly representative of the people, the right to elect 
legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a 
"bedrock of our political system. It could hardly he 
gainsaid that a constitutional claim had been asserted 
"by an allegation that certain otherwise qualified voters 
had been entirely prohibited from voting for members of 
their state legislature. And, if a State should provide 
that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should 
be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight 
of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it 
could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those 
residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively 
diluted. It would appear extraordinary to suggest that 
a State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a 
law providing that certain of the State's voters could 
vote two, five or 10 times for their legislative repre-
sentatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only 
once0 And it is inconceivable that a state law to the effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes 
of citizens in one part of the State would be multiplied 
by two, five, or 10, while the votes of persons in 
another area would be counted only at face value, could 
be constitutionally sustainable. Of course, the effect 
of state legislative districting schemes which give the 
same number of representatives to unequal numbers of con-
stituents is identical., Overweighting and overvaluation 
of the votes of those living here has the certain effect 
of dilution and undervaluation of the votes of those 
living there. The resulting discrimination against 
those individual voters living in disfavored areas is 
easily demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote 
is simply not the same right to vote as that of those 
living in a favored part of the State. Two, five or 10 
of them must vote before the effect of their voting is 
equivalent to that of their favored neighbor. Weighting 
the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, 
merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly 
seems justifiable. One must be ever aware that the 
Constitution forbids "sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of discrimination." Lane v. Wilson. 307 U.S. 
268, 275, Gomillion v, Lightfoot. 3&U U.S.339, 3k2~. As we 
stated in Wesberr.y v. Sanders, supra: 
"We do not believe that the Framers of the Con-
stitution intended to permit the same vote-diluting 
discrimination to be accomplished through the device 
of districts containing widely varied numbers of 
inhabitants. To say that a vote is worth more in 
one district than in another would „ . . run counter 
to our fundamental ideas of democratic government 
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State legislatures are, historically, the fountain-
head. of representative government in this country. A 
number of them have their roots in colonial times, and 
substantially antedate the creation of our Nation and 
our Federal Government, In fact, the first formal 
stirrings of American political independence are to "be 
found, in large part, in the views and actions of 
several of the colonial legislative "bodies,, With the 
"birth of our National Government, and the adoption and 
ratification of the Federal Constitution, state legis-
latures retained a most important place in our Nation's 
governmental structure. But representative government 
is in essence self-government through the medium of 
elected representatives of the people, and each and 
every citizen has an inalienable right to full and 
effective participation in the political processes of 
his State's legislative bodies. Most citizens can 
achieve this participation only as qualified voters 
through the election of legislators to represent them. 
Full and effective participation by all citizens in 
state government requires, therefore, that each citizen 
have an equally effective voice in the election of members 
of his state legislature. Modern and viable state 
government needs, and the Constitution demands, no less. 
Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on 
representative government, it would seem reasonable that 
a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority 
of that State's legislators. To conclude differently, 
and to sanction minority control of state legislative 
bodies, would appear to deny majority rights in a way 
that far surpasses any possible denial of minority rights 
that might otherwise be thought to result. Since 
legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which 
all citizens are to be governed, they should be bodies 
which are collectively responsive to the popular will. 
And the c o n c e p t o f e q u a l protection has "been traditionally 
viewed as requiring the uhiform treatment of persons 
standing in the same relation to the governmental action 
questioned or challenged. With respect to the allocation 
of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of 
a State, stand in the same relation regardless of where 
they live. Any suggested criteria for the differentiation 
of citizens are insufficient to justify any discrimination, 
as to the weight of their votes, unless relevant to the 
permissible purposes of legislative apportionment. Since 
the achieving of fair and effective representation for all 
citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative 
apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection 
Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation 
by all voters in the election of state legislators. 
Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence 
impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based 
upon factors such as race, Brown v. Board of Education. 
32+7 U.S. 2483, or economic status, Griffin v. Illinois. 
351 U.S. 12, Douglas v. California. 372 U.S. 353. Our 
constitutional system amply provides for the protection 
of minorities by means other than giving them majority 
control of state legislatures. And the democratic ideals 
of equality and majority rule, which have served this 
Nation so well in the past, are hardly of any less 
significance for the present and the future. 
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We are told that the matter of apportioning 
representation in a state legislature is. a complex 
and many-faceted one. We are a:dvised that States 
can rationally consider factors other than population 
in apportioning legislative representation. We are 
admonished not to restrict the power of the States to 
impose differing views as to political philosophy 
on their citizens. We are cautioned about the dangers 
of entering into political thickets and mathematical 
quagmires. Our answer is this : a denial of con-
stitutionally protected rights demands judicial 
protection; our oath and our office require no less 
of us. As stated in G-omillion v. Ljghtfoot. supra: 
"When a State exercises power wholly within 
the domain of state interest, it is insulated 
from federal judicial review. But such insulation 
is not carried over when state power is used as an 
instrument for circumventing a federally protected 
right." 
To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, 
he is that much less a citizen. The fact that an 
individual lives here or there is not a legitimate 
reason for over-weighting or diluting the efficacy of 
his vote. The complexions of societies and civilizations 
change, often with amazing rapidity. A nation once 
primarily rural in character becomes predominantly urban. 
Representation schemes once fair and equitable become 
archaic and outdated. But the basic principle of 
representative government remains, and must remain, 
unchanged - the weight of a citizen's vote cannot be 
made to depend on where he lives. Population is, of 
necessity, the starting point for consideration and tte 
controlling criterion for judgment in legislative 
apportionment controversies. 
A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so 
because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is 
the clear and strong command of our Constitution's 
Equal Protection Clause. This is an essential part of 
the concept of a government of laws and not men. This 
is at the heart of Lincoln's vision of "government of the 
people, by the people, (and) for the people." The 
Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially 
equal state legislative representation for all citizens, 
of all places as well as of all races. 
Now it is clear that the American precedent for us then is 
that the Federal Court will construe in relation to Federal 
districting, provision in general terms that members are to be chosen 
by the people to mean that one person one vote and one vote one value 
must obtain in the drawing of district boundaries, and, secondly 
that if in the Federal Constitution there is a provision relating 
to the general rights of citizens of a State that this binds the 
States and can affect their Constitutions in such a manner as to 
allow the granting of prerogative remedies by the Federal Court. 
What then is our situation in Australia as compared with the American precedent? 
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As far as the Federal position is concerned, we have in our 
Commonwealth Constitution a provision "by Section 2k that !,The 
House of Representatives shall "be composed of members directly 
chosen "by the people of the Commonwealth........." and also 
"The number of members chosen in the several States shall "be 
in proportion to the respective numbers of their people". 
These words are at least as strong for the contention adopted 
"by the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States as 
those of the United States Constitution upon which ours was 
founded, and some might well regard them as being rather stronger. 
However, it cannot be said that historically the same con-
tending forces existslin our Federal Conventions as those which 
were so explicit in the Federalist Convention in the Unites States. 
It may, of course, be said that our Conventionists were adopting 
a view already clearly established from the Unites States in 
using very similar wording in our Constitution, but there was some 
debate in our conventions on this matter, principally emanating 
from delegates who either represented South Australia at the 
Convention or who had some connection with that State. Dr. 
Cockburn, for South Australia, moved (see the Convention Reports 
on the Commonwealth of Australia Bill, 2nd April, 1891, p.6li+) 
that the principle of manhood suffrage and also the principle 
of one man one vote be embodied in the Constitution. This was 
opposed by others, including some from South Australia, led by 
Mr. Thomas Playford, but,in supporting Dr. Cockburn, Sir George 
Grey (then Governor-General of New Zealand, and former Governor 
of South Australia) said -
"I think there can be no doubt whatever that a 
clear case can be made out for the absolute'necessity 
of giving only one vote to each man, and giving every 
man a right to vote on the question of returning 
representatives to the central parliament. If 
hon. gentlemen will reflect over the circumstances 
of the case, they will find that the original idea 
I believe in every one of these colonies was that 
there should only be one vote possessed by each man. 
That was the original conception. That undoubtedly 
was the conception in New Zealand." 
Further on, Sir George said:-
"We had a hardy set of people to deal with 
in South Australia, who knew precisely what their 
rights were, and who were determined to get them; 
and they succeeded in obtaining, I believe, a more 
liberal constitution than is possessed by any other 
part of Australasia-, That was the result." 
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Another extract from Sir George's speech readss-
"I feel certain that if that is done then we shall 
feel it our duty to introduce a clause which will give 
to the states the power of starting with one man one 
vote. You will "be told, hon. gentlemen, that this 
will "be making an alteration in the constitution of the 
states, and taking from them a privilege. I say the 
only privilege taken away will "be the right of the 
minority to oppress the majority. That certainly 
will "be taken away; "but if the people choose to have 
a constitution of that kind they can instantly restore 
it. It requires "but one vote simply to say we shall 
have our old constitution "back again; a single clause 
will do it, and they may go on then as they are going 
on now. But if the privilege for which we now contend 
"be not granted, I feel sure that many years will in some 
cases elapse "before that "boon will "be won and gained 
which now can "be instantaneously given." 
Sir John Downer, father of the present High Commissioner, also 
supported the principle, and Mr. G.S. Kingston said:^ -
"We are surely justified in laying down some rules 
for their guidance, and when the proper time comes I 
shall be found recording my vote in favour of the 
amendment indicated by my colleague, Dr. Cockburn." 
Mr. Kingston further stated 
"I have a strong belief in the propriety, when we 
are establishing a constituency for the return of 
members to a national assembly, of insisting on the 
right of each individual to one vote in virtue of 
his individuality, of recognising that right and 
conceding it to him on that ground, and denying it 
to him on all other grounds; and it is for that 
reason that I shall record my vote in favour of the 
amendment." 
They were, however, unsuccessful in incorporating a provision 
ensuring that the right to vote for the Federal Parliament should 
clearly ensure that State laws did not prevent one man one vote 
and one vote one value obtaining, and no such provision exists in 
the Federal Constitution such as the equal protection clause of 
the United States Fourteenth Amendment, which would bind the States 
in relation to their own Constitutions. 
As a result of this, we have seen . . the gross weighting of 
certain districts in such a way as to result in minorities electing 
Governments and majorities having no effective voice in either 
electing or rejecting them. Such things have occurred in the States 
of Australia, and the most recent distribution for the Federal 
Parliament at times contravenes the standards so far adopted by 
the United States Supreme Court in Judging whether districting of 
congressional districts or State legislative districts is 
constitutionally proper. 
We have also seen that the State of South Australia, the hardi-
hood and democracy of whose citizens received such praise at Federal 
Conventions, has now become one of the most noted examples of 
provision of weighted voting and minority rule. The present 
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Opposition in South Australia received at the last State eLection 
a greater vote than the reigning Government in any State of 
Australia received at the election which put it there, and the 
present Government in South Australia took office with only 
U3 per cent of the vote, a situation which has been specifically 
ruled against "by the Supreme Court of the United States in more 
than one case. 
How far can citizens in Australia ensure the enshrining in 
Constitutions of provisions which will not allow a Government 
to take advantage of a temporary majority to alter the equal 
justice previously provided for citizens or to prevent the 
obtaining of that equal justice which all citizens ought to have? 
In South Australia at the time of the founding of the State 
Constitution a unanimous vote of all elected members of the 
Legislative Council established to draw up the Constitution under 
the I8I+8 Act for the better government of the colonies provided 
for the basis of election for the Lower House to be manhood 
suffrage, and that representatives should be elected for districts 
substantially equal in numbers of population. The latter 
provision was not provided for directly in the Constitution as it 
was in the Alabama Constitution, but only provided for in the 
initial electoral distribution of districts, and this has allowed 
temporary conservative majorities to overthrow the original basis 
of the Constitution* 
Most States of Australia (other than Tasmania) in the last 
UO years have seen distributions heavilyveighting votes for 
various areas, and there are no provisions in the Constitution of 
the States.which prevent this from happening: indeed, in some 
cases the provisions of the Constitution ensure that it does 
happen. If there is a majority of legislators in power under 
the provisions of an existing Constitution and against whom the 
majority of citizens would have no effective remedy because the 
weight of their votes had been diminished in the way so roundly 
condemned by the United States Supreme Court, what remedy would 
these citizens then have? 
Probably the only way to ensure that justice is done to 
citizens in Australia would be to amend the Federal Constitution 
of Australia to bind the States as the Federal Constitution of 
the United States has done. I have heard it suggested that this 
could not effectively be accomplished, and that a State 
Constitution could not be amended or have limitations imposed 
upon it by an amendment to the Federal Constitution since the 
States are themselves sovereign bodies. I believe that that 
view is quite mistaken and, notwithstanding Section 107 
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of the Federal Constitution, I see no reason why a Bill of 
Rights establishing the general rights of the citizens of 
the Commonwealth should not be incorporated into the Common-
wealth of Australia Constitution, and if it were to be so 
incorporated I do not believe that it would be held not in any 
way to affect the operations of the States in their own 
Constitutions or their general activities. On the other hand, 
there are certain obstacles still in the way. As far as the 
existing provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act are concerned in relation to House of Representative district 
boundaries, the High Court has never shown itself to be as 
liberal in interpretation of words in the Constitution as has 
the Supreme Court of the United States in recent years. If, 
however, there was something more explicit in the Federal 
Constitution by way of a Bill of Rights, such as is being currently 
contended for, then, of course, a clear direction would be there, 
but there are still some obstacles in procedure to overcome. 
The High Court in the cases of Hughes & Vale Pt.v. Limited 
Gair 90 C.L.R. at p.203, and in Clayton & Ors. v. Heffron & Ors. 
in 103 G.L.R. at pc21i+ has been reluctant to grant' a remedy 
by way of injunction to prevent the presentation of a Bill for 
assent. 
Perhaps it may be open in relation to an unconstitutional pro-
cedure in a State seeking to enact unequal distribution by a State 
Parliament to seek a declaration of right, but the question 
remains open as to how far such a declaration can be effectively 
enforced. I know that Western Australian lawyers will have their 
memories exercised on this particular score, but it certainly does' 
seem that we are in some difficulty in Australia in providing the 
kind of remedies which have been availed of by citizens in the 
United States before the Supreme Court there. It is true that the 
view of the High Court concerning injunctions does not seem to 
have been followed by the Privy Council in a number of cases, 
and particularly in Moore v. the A.G. for the Irish Free State 
1935 A .C. at p . b u t , o f course, it is fashionable these days 
for the States as well as the Commonwealth fo talk about abolishing 
appeals to the Privy Council, a step which has, happily, not been 
taken in South Australia so far. 
All this means that we in Australia have not got the same 
rights and protection enshrined in our Constitution that in some 
cases our forefathers designed to provide for us, and which, at any 
rate, are clearly enshrined in the Constitution of the United States 
of America. It is easy enough to say, "Well, that is the 
United States; what has it to do with us?", but in a literate 
country the principles of representative government do not change 
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with climate geography or distribution of population. Australia, 
dust as the United States, is becoming overwhelmingly an urban 
civilisation. Sophisticated means of transport and communication 
are within the financial competence of any Parliament to provide 
to its members. There is no longer reason to plead for special 
weighting for sparsely populated areas if Parliaments are prepared 
to provide for their members facilities which will ensure that 
those members adequately represent the people who put them there. 
The way ahead to ensure simple and effective majority rule 
in the classic terms so clearly stated by Chief Justice Earl 
Warren may be a long and hard one for the Australian people, but 
it is no less worth while today than when it was said in such 
clear terms by Sir George Grey, Dr. Cockburn and other supporters 
m 1891, or when Colonel Rainborough made his plea to a dictator 
m the 17th century. 
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